Easter Offensive
Wallace Stanley Tyson
Commander, 1/12th Cavalry, 1971-1972
At the beginning of April 1972, the NVA began their Easter Offensive with three separate massive ground attacks supported by large amounts of armor, artillery and anti aircraft weapons. The initial attack came across the DMZ toward Quang Tri and Hue and a second attack from Laos and Cambodia was directed toward Pleiku and Kontum in the central highlands.
The third NVA attack came from Cambodia toward Loc Ninh and An Loc in Military Region III. Within a matter of days Loc Ninh succumbed and the NVA moved south toward An Loc, which soon became besieged by three North Vietnamese divisions. If the NVA captured An Loc, a decisive drive down Highway 13 into Saigon could have ended the war. An Loc was only 30 miles northwest from our location at FSB Bunker Hill.
The Cav’s helicopters were providing support to the ARVNs but no ground troops had been alerted. Three weeks after the Easter Offensive started the contingency planning reached the battalion level. The following details are from a letter I wrote to my wife, Dotty.
April 21, 1972
Up to the northwest, it appears the NVA have decided to give it another try with a two phased effort. The first was to take a key hill just east of An Loc, and the second was to launch a three sided attack against what is left of the town. The hill was taken this morning. So once again, we are watching for activity on the horizon.
General Hamlet has discussed the contingency “what if’s” with the Battalion Commanders, and if it comes down to it, it could get grim. One assumption was that the ARVN defensive position at An Loc had collapsed, and the NVA were moving south in strength down Route 13 towards Saigon. If that were true, the 3rd Brigade of the Cav would be the only combat unit standing between the NVA and the Capital. On the plus side is the availability of the Air Force B-52’s flying out of Guam and that all the battalions of the Cav are positioned south of the Dong Nai River. Lt Col Blagg’s 2/8th Cav would head north on a “movement to contact” in order to buy time for Lt Col Hodges’ 1/7th Cav and me to get our battalions into platoon and company blocking positions across the avenues of approach coming down from the north.
We in turn, would be charged with providing time for the military system south of us to disassemble itself and evacuate Long Binh and Saigon. That stacks up to three US battalions against three NVA divisions. In Hollywood, that’s not bad odds, but over here that’s a little on the thin side.
The 1/12th Cav would have to cover a seventeen kilometer front – that’s a little better than eleven miles. We would be conducting a modified defense of a riverline. Under perfect conditions, we would have support units stacked behind us, but not this time. They’ve all gone home.
There are many problems associated with putting the troops out on a thin line of isolated positions along that great a frontage, but the main ones would be control, resupply, communications, and getting as many of them as possible out in time to keep them from being overrun.
Much would depend on the helicopters remaining available to us. If we lost them, and it came down to it, about all we would be able to do after a given time would be to reassemble the battalion at predetermined rallying points and move overland the forty-five miles to the Vung Tau peninsula. We’d merge with others gathering there, form some sort of defensive line and wait for the US Navy to take us off.
We have to do some serious thinking about how we could get the job done and still come away with most of our people.
Webmaster’s Note:
The ARVN forces, with the assistance of US air power, held at An Loc and defeated the NVA and the 1st Cav did not have to provide a blocking force.